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TORTS
ADAMS v. EL-BASH, 338 S.E.2d 381 (W. Va. 1985).
Civil Procedure-Evidence-Patient Need Standard-Physician Disclosure-Torts
In this malpractice action, a jury verdict in the Circuit Court of Cabell County
'favored the defendant. Appellee, Dr. Omar El-Bash, performed a urethrotomy
on appellant Robert Adams. Subsequent to the operation Adams became incon-
tinent to a degree that made it necessary for him to wear diapers. The appellants
sued both for negligence and the commission of a battery because the procedure
was performed without an informed consent of the patient.
The court addressed two issues in this case: (1) Whether the verdict of the
jury, insofar as it found that Adams gave an informed consent to the operation,
was contrary to the weight and preponderance of the evidence, so that it should
be set aside, and (2) whether the discovery of new evidence entitled appellants
to a new trial.
The court discussed the standard for informed consent, and the patient need
standard adopted by West Virginia, rather than disclosure standards based upon
national or community medical disclosure practice. In addition, the court added
to this an objective test relating to proximate cause used in other jurisdictions.
In cases applying the doctrine of informed consent, where a physician fails to
disclose the risks of surgery in accordance with the patient need standard of
disclosure and the patient suffers an injury as a result of this surgery, a causal
relationship between such failure to disclose information and damage to the pa-
tient, may be shown if a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances would
have refused to consent to the surgery had the risks been properly disclosed. In
this case the appellants carried their burden of proving informed consent, but
there was no direct evidence presented on the causation issue. The jury was prop-
erly instructed and free to draw reasonable inferences from the expert's opinions
as to the risks of the urethrotomy. The appellants assertion of the relevance of
their new evidence did not meet several standards laid down for the granting of
a new trial on such a basis. They did not exercise due diligence in locating their
new witness, and his testimony would have been cumulative rather than new and
material. It was not such evidence as to produce an opposite result at a second
trial on the merits. Therefore, trial judge's denial of a new trial on this ground
was correct.
CHAMBERLAINE & FLO WERS, INC. v. SMITH CONTRA CTING, INC., 341
S.E.2d 414 (W. Va. 1986).
Civil Procedure-Insurance-Nonfeasance
This consolidated action against United States Fidelity and Guaranty Com-
pany (USF & G) by Smith Contracting alleged the wrongful refusal to pay an
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insurance claim, negligence, and outrage in connection with damages to a Cat-
erpillar tractor. Smith instituted its action fifteen months after USF & G denied
coverage, despite a policy provision limiting the time to file suit to one year after
the discovery by the insured of the occurrence giving rise to the claim. The Circuit
Court of Harrison County granted USF & G's motion for summary judgment.
The issues were: (1) Where a piece of equipment is covered by a personal
property floater to a marine insurance policy, and the floater was very similar
to casualty insurance, whether the rider should be treated as casualty insurance
with its noncommitant limitations period; (2) whether the appellee's refusal to
act on an insurance claim creates tort liability herein; and (3) whether a cor-
poration can recover on a claim of the infliction of severe emotional distress.
The court found that the one year filing provision in marine policies are
specifically allowed by section 33-6-14 of the West Virginia Code, and the code
elsewhere unambiguously provides that a marine policy includes personal property
floaters. It would have been incorrect to treat this floater as casualty insurance.
In addition, appellant's contract claim was barred by the one year limitation
provision. The appellee's refusal to pay on the policy was not a negligent act,
but an affirmative refusal to act and as such consitutes nonfeasance, not mis-
feasance. Unless there is some duty to act apart from the contract, there is gen-
erally no tort liability for nonfeasance. "It is difficult to conceive how any conduct,
no matter how outrageous, could inflict severe emotional distress on a corpo-
ration." Therefore a corporation cannot recover for this tort. The court found
that the trial court had properly dismissed all three counts of the appellant's
complaint. The award of summary judgment, though, may have been improper,
since the court limited its inquiry to the plaintiff's theory of law only. The court
must look for other possible causes of action before ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, and see whether there are any grounds for an amended com-
plaint.
CRANE & EQUIPMENT RENTAL CO. v. PARK INC., 350 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va.
1986).
Evidence-Negligence-Proximate Cause-Torts
The Circuit Court of Kanawha County had denied motions for a directed
verdict and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of appellant Park
Corporation, and the jury found Park ninety per cent negligent and plaintiff Crane
Equipment ten percent negligent in a suit brought by Southwestern Engineering
Company, Crane, and Louisiana Light against Park Corporation, and a separate
suit by Crane against Park for injuries to Crane's equipment, both suits having
been consolidated. Plaintiffs maintained that an accident involving a 161 ton
condenser being loaded onto a barge at Park Corporation's loading dock in South
Charleston became imbalanced and fell onto the barge, causing damage to Crane's
equipment. The plaintiffs further maintained the accident was caused by Park's
1987]
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negligent maintenance of the dock, the concrete of which was cracked and had
sunk a number of inches in previous years.
The issues were: (1) Whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find
the appellant guilty of primary negligence, which itself was the proximate cause
of the injuries, thus rendering the refusal to direct a verdict for appellant correct;
(2) whether an injury, by itself, is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
negligence; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to a
jury.
The court held that the jury could have reasonably inferred from evidence
that the dock supporting the downriver crane settled about two inches during the
loading operation. However, there was an absence of evidence as to what might
have caused the dock to settle. Within a few days after the accident, Crane Equip-
ment used the dock, without incident, to load six condensers onto river barges.
It was therefore improper for the trial court to permit the jury to speculate on
the cause of the accident. The court erred in not directing a verdict in favor of
the defendant.
DELP v. ITMANN COAL CO., 342 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1986).
Civil Procedure-Defective Repairs-Employer-Liability-Evidence-Mandoli-
dis Torts
The appellant, an underground coal miner, was injured when the ripper head
of a continuous miner machine swerved to the side and pinned him against a rib
of coal. He suffered a broken leg, injuries to the back and chest, and was unable
to return to work for almost three years. The control levers of the machine had
been improperly bolted, the proper levers or shear pins having been removed.
Seeking damages, the appellant labeled his injuries the direct and proximate result
of the appellee's willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct in making defective
repairs to the machine. The Circuit Court of Wyoming County found insufficient
evidence to submit the issue to the jury and directed a verdict for Itmann Coal
Company. Delp's motion for a new trial was denied.
The court decided two issues in this case: (1) Whether evidence of willful,
wanton, and reckless misconduct was sufficient to warrant a finding of deliberate
intent to injure appellant on the part of the appellee; and (2) whether it was error
for the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the appellee in light of those
facts which the jury might have properly found under the evidence.
In affirming the judgment of the circuit court, the court found that there
was no evidence that the appellee's use of a bolt instead of the proper cotter pin
either caused the machine to malfunction or brought about any violation of federal
or state safety regulations. Nor was there anything to indicate that the appellee
knew that the machine presented a danger to persons working around it. While
the appellee may have been negligent in allowing substitution of an improper part
[Vol. 89
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in repairing the machine, such a showing was not sufficient to prove the deliberate
intent required under Mandolidis. The directed verdict for appellee was properly
granted.
HARDMAN TRUCKING, INC. v. POLING TRUCKING CO., 346 S.E.2d 551
(W. Va. 1986).
Civil Procedure-Lost Profits-Measure of Damages-Prejudgment Interest-Torts
The plaintiff, Hardman, had sought damages resulting from a collision be-
tween one of its triaxle dump trucks and another such vehicle belonging to James
Foltz and lessee Poling, in the form of repairs, loss of profits, towing, lost stone,
and inconvenience. The jury in the Circuit Court of Randolph County awarded
the plaintiff $56,000. On defendants' motion, the court set aside the verdict and
granted a new trial, permitting prejudgment interest only on the damages for
towing and lost stone.
The issues addressed by the court were: (1) Whether an improper standard
was used for measuring damages resulting from injury to the truck; (2) whether
the court's conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove loss of profits was correct;
(3) whether the plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages; and (4) whether the court's
denial of prejudgment interest on lost profits and repairs, and denial of damages
for inconvenience was supported by the evidence.
In affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding, the court held that
there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict on damages to the truck,
including testimony on its market value, all repair bills, and attribution as to
which flowed from the defendants' negligence. Loss of profits which naturally
followed the wrongful act and were certain both in their nature and their cause
were also sufficiently demonstrated. The appellant's evidence showed that it was
impossible to lease a replacement vehicle. The jury could reasonably have believed
this and weighed it in its disposition of the amount awarded for loss of profits,
which was lower than the amount claimed by Hardman. Since an award of pre-
judgment interest on an ascertainable pecuniary loss is a proper element of dam-
ages in a tort action, and the damages herein are reasonably susceptible to
calculation, they are subject to prejudgment interest. As to inconvenience, the
trial judge correctly found that appellant presented no evidence of being incon-
venienced, and this award was properly set aside. In sum, the order setting aside
the verdict and granting a new trial was reversed, except that portion of the order
setting aside the verdict of $2,000 for inconvenience was affirmed. The order
denying prejudgment interest was reversed, and the case remanded for further
proceedings.
PAINTIFF v. PARKERSBURG, 345 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1986).
Locality Rule Abolished-Medical Malpractice-Torts
19871
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The Circuit Court of Wood County had granted a directed verdict in favor
of the defendant hospital and defendant physician based upon the plaintiffs' fail-
ure to produce expert medical testimony from witnesses who had personal knowl-
edge of the appropriate standard of performance of the average surgeon in good
standing in the area of Parkersburg, West Virginia, in September, 1981.
Dr. William Gilmore's performance of a surgical tubal ligation upon Mrs.
Paintiff at a time when she was three to four weeks pregnant produced pain,
infections, and prompted a therapeutic abortion, but the testimony of both of
plaintiffs' witnesses was deemed inadmissible when they could not assert infor-
mation as to the standard practice of general surgeons in Parkersburg.
The principle issue in this case was whether it was error for the trial court
to excuse the testimony of two witnesses competent in the performance of the
surgical operation at issue because they were unfamiliar with the peculiarities of
surgical practice in Parkersburg.
The court stated that West Virginia had virtually abandoned the locality rule
and that much has been written about its obsolescence. Hence, this case abolished
the locality rule in West Virginia. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Wood
County was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
ROBERTS v. STEVENS CLINIC HOSP. INC., 345 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1986).
Civil Procedure-Evidence-Medical Malpractice-Remittitur- Torts- Wrongful
Death
A McDowell County circuit court jury awarded $10,000,000 in favor of the
parents and two siblings of Michael Joseph Roberts, a two and one-half year old
child who died as the result of medical malpractice. In the performance of an
authorized biopsy, defendant physician perforated the child's colon, which led to
peritonitis. The parents also alleged negligence by the hospital staff in that no
antibiotics were administered to the patient for more than seven hours afterwards,
or until seven minutes before the final operation took his life. Negligence and
liability findings were conceded by the defendant physician (eighty-two percent)
but not by the defendant hospital (eighteen percent). Both defendant-appellants
asserted that the damage award was excessive.
The court determined five issues in the case: (1) Whether it was error to
refuse defendant's instruction to the jury that they should decide the case ac-
cording to the evidence and that bias, sentiment or feelings of sympathy had no
proper legal weight; (2) whether it was error to impanel a jury which included
the grandmother of the plaintiff's decedent; (3) whether it was error to allow the
plaintiff to inquire of a hospital employee about previous complaints by the nurs-
ing staff against defendant Dr. Magnus; (4) whether the court committed error
in refusing to recall the jury or to determine the validity of a rumor that an
initial vote of the panel was for an award of $250 million; and (5) whether the
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admission of a professional videotape of a "theatrical" presentation which art-
istically highlighted aspects of the deceased child's life and relationship to his
mother in an inaccurate way was error.
The court held that nearly all of the defendant's assignments of error relative
to instructions and the composition of the jury were not matters of objection at
trial. The refused instructions simply repeated other instructions given by the
court, and it was not error to refuse an instruction which was adequately covered
by another instruction. No objection was made at the time of voir dire to the
grandmother's presence, even though the individual voir dire was extensive. Be-
cause one of the grounds for the hospital's liability was its possible negligence
in allowing Dr. Magnus to practice there, questioning of the staff was proper.
Moreover, there was expert testimony in the record that the hospital did not have
the type of pediatric care facilities required by West Virginia Department of Health
Regulations, that Michael Roberts was not monitored appropriately, that the hos-
pital violated regulations on patient consent in this case, and was negligent in
granting Dr. Magnus full surgical privileges in light of his limited surgical back-
ground, and the jury's finding of negligence by the hospital was correct. The fact
that a higher damages amount was discussed by the jury was irrelevant, and
nothing more than a restatement that the final award was excessive. The ad-
missibility of videotapes and films was within the wide discretion of the trial
court, and the record shows no abuse of discretion in this respect.
The one meritorious assignment of error was the excessiveness of the verdict.
Thus, the court was compelled to reduce the award from $10,000,000 to $3,000,000,
although this is unusual in West Virginia when damages in a case do not admit
of an exact calculation. The court took the unusual step of asking the parties to
describe the pretrial settlement negotiations, as a guide to the court both on this
remittitur and in future settlement jurisprudence. Finding that defendant Magnus
made a final offer of an unsatisfactory amount only three days before the trial,
the court wished to establish a more proper climate and guidelines for out-of-
court settlements. While high damage awards must be allowed to cover the enor-
mous cost of litigation by plaintiffs whose cases drag on for years, they must
also reflect public policy considerations aimed at preventing the tort system from
becoming a lottery where everyone pays high insurance premiums so that enor-
mous windfalls can be allocated randomly. "The sky is not the limit with regard
to jury awards." The court reversed and remanded with directions to enter a
remittitur of $7,000,000 and judgment on the verdict for $3,000,000, or, in the
alternative, at the option of the plaintiff, to award a new trial.
Justice McHugh, dissenting, felt that the majority's action was an unconsti-
tutional invasion of the province of the jurors, and that article III, section 13
of the West Virginia Constitution expressly safeguards the verdict in addition to
guaranteeing the right to a jury trial. Where the jury finds the defendant liable
in a wrongful death action, it has virtually absolute discretion, under the express
terms of the wrongful death statute, without regard to proof of actual damages,
1987]
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pecuniary loss, etc., to make any award it deems "fair and just." Moreover, in
1976, the legislature removed the statutory "ceiling" on recovery, and this is
reaffirmed by West Virginia Code section 55-7-6(b). According to McHugh, the
appropriate remedy for an excessive sum which meets the limited guidelines as
such is the award of a new trial, not a remittitur, which is proper only where
the excessive portion of the verdict is clearly distinguishable as a matter of law
from the remainder of the verdict. The jury award here was not excessive, in
McHugh's view, given the enormous tragedy of this child's loss, or that of any
child. The money will be divided among four individuals, and the sum is com-
mensurate with malpractice case statistical data. McHugh felt that the validity of
the court's use of pretrial settlement information was also highly questionable.
McHugh also questioned why the court in such a case should not also have access
to the jury's deliberations to assist it in substituting its opinions for the jurors.
Justice McGraw dissenting, found that the degree of malpractice associated
with the coniission of these acts was nothing short of horrifying. He felt that the
jury was unaware of the amount of available insurance coverage (which was
$10,250,000 in fact) and understandably shocked by the malpractice of community
health professionals, returned a verdict which the majority wished to reduce to
a more "reasonable" figure. McGraw discussed the point that in effect, the ma-
jority anticipated that the defendants could combine to commit acts more than
three times larger than the amount of harm to a single individual than that done
to Michael Roberts and his family. McGraw, felt that protection of the profit-
ability of insurance companies is achieved only at the expense of the legal and
moral rights of those injured by medical malpractice, and that faith in the ordinary
people who make up the jury is at the heart of the American system.
TOTTEN v. ADONGAY, 337 S.E.2d 2 (W. Va. 1985).
Burden of Proof--Evidence-Expert Testimony-Medical Malpractice-Torts
The Circuit Court of Wayne County awarded the physician defendant a di-
rected verdict on the ground that the plaintiff's evidence did not establish a prima
facie right of recovery, due to lack of expert medical testimony delineating the
pertinent standard of care. After x-raying and examining the plaintiff's injured
wrist on two occasions, the defendant ruled out any fracture or dislocation as a
source of the plaintiff's pain and discomfort. Examination by a second physician
discovered a fracture present for some time, which had produced aseptic necrosis,
requiring surgery and physical therapy, with the hand not fully restored at the
time of trial.
The three issues in this case were: (1) Whether the plaintiffs met their burden
of proof simply by the deposition testimony of the second examining physician;
(2) whether expert medical testimony is essential in a medical malpractice action,
so as to justify a directed verdict against plaintiffs by its its absence; and (3)
whether the "common knowledge" exception to the expert testimony rule is ap-
[Vol. 89
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plicable herein, where a second physician finds a fracture on the x-ray film taken
by the physician against whom negligence is sought to be proven.
The court, in reversing the circuit court's decision, held that while the record
indicated that additional medical testimony may have been helpful to a jury de-
termination of negligence, the admitted immediate proximity of the actual injury
to the point of complaint precluded the need for expert medical testimony as a
matter of law in this case. Where lack of care or want of skill is so gross as to
be apparent, or the breach relates to noncomplex matters of diagnosis and treat-
ment within the understanding of lay jurors by resort to common knowledge and
experience, failure to present expert testimony is not fatal to a plaintiff's prima
facie showing of negligence. The testimony was such that the jury further could
have concluded that proper diagnosis and treatment by the defendant probably
would have prevented the eventual deterioration of the bone fragment in plaintiff's
wrist. The directed verdict for the defendant was error.
Justice Neely, concurring in part and dissenting in part, felt that the majority
opinion should not be read to authorize submission of malpractice cases to the
jury in future cases on the basis of lay evidence alone.
Gerald Bobango
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